We extend the study of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) from Nash strategic games to a class of qualitative games. Also in this case, the IESDS process leads us to a kind of rationalizable result. We define several types of dominance relation and game reduction and establish conditions under which a unique and nonempty maximal reduction exists. We generalize, in this way, some results due to Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) and Apt (2007) .
INTRODUCTION
Bernheim [3] and Pearce [16] studied the rationalizable strategic behavior in the framework of non-cooperative strategic games introduced by Nash [14] . The rational behavior of the players is a fundamental assumption in Game theory. It implies that each strategic game can be characterized by a process of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS). The result of this process is known as the maximal reduction of the game.
The iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies has several different definitions. We must refer to the approaches of Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [9, 10] , Milgrom and Roberts [13] , Marx and Swinkels [12] , Ritzberger [17] , Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] , Chen, Long and Luo [5] , or Apt [1, 2] as some important ones in the literature. Osborne and Rubinstein [15] and Rubinstein [18] also developed some topics concerning rationality.
The main problems concerning the IESDS procedure are related to the non-emptiness and uniqueness of the limit game. In the case of infinite games, the order of reductions is important, and the maximal reduction may not be unique if different paths are considered. Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] proved the uniqueness and nonemptiness of the maximal reduction for a strategic game with compact strategy sets and continuous payoff functions. Apt [1] treated the various definitions of IESDS in a unitary way, specifying the games where the definitions coincide. His approach is based on complete lattice and the study of operators.
In order to develop the ideas concerning the rationality, we consider a model which generalizes the strategic game. We consider the qualitative games which have, for every player, a strategy set and a preference correspondence constructed by using the utility functions. Nash's equilibrium point is seen in this framework as a maximal element. We also consider different types of majorized correspondences, which generalize the well-known semicontinuous ones. So, we work with U-majorized correspondences defined by Yuan and Tarafdar [20] , Q θ −majorized correspondences introduced by Liu and Cai [11] and L S -majorized correspondences due to G. X. Yuan [19] . We use theorems which prove the existence of maximal elements for qualitative games having these types of considered correspondences. These results are due to Ding [7] , Liu and Cai [11] , and Chang [4] .
Our new approach wants to emphasize that the IESDS process leads to a kind of´rationalizable´result in the extended games. By changing the context, we underline the idea of rationality, obtained in an iterated process of elimination the unfitted strategies. We want to highlight the concept, rather than the context where it was initially defined. We introduce several types of dominance relation and game reduction and establish conditions under which a unique and nonempty maximal reduction exists. In this way, we generalize, some results due to Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] and Apt [1] . On the other hand, the examples of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] involve games with discontinuous utility functions and this fact gives us the idea that the problem of order independence can be raised for qualitative games, which can also be generalizations of discontinuous strategic games.
The paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 contains preliminaries concerning topological properties of correspondences and qualitative games. The main results are presented in Section 3, after the subsections containing the introduction of definitions, the problem of game reduction and order independence and the conditions under which order independence is obtained. The last subsection is dedicated to proving that the set of maximal elements is preserved in any game by the process of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Concluding remarks are presented at the end.
PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS

TOPOLOGICAL PROPERTIES OF CORRESPONDENCES
Throughout this paper, we shall use the following notations and definitions:
Let A be a subset of a topological space X. 2 A denotes the family of all subsets of A. cl A denotes the closure of A in X. If A is a subset of a vector space, coA denotes the convex hull of
We present the notion of a compactly open (compactly closed) set, introduced by Ding [6] . 
3. T is said to have open lower sections if T −1 (y) := {x ∈ X : y ∈ T (x)} is open in X for each y ∈ Y.
QUALITATIVE GAMES
Let I be a non-empty set (the set of agents). For each i ∈ I, let G i be a non-empty topological vector space representing the set of actions, let
G i be the preference correspondence and u i : i∈I G i → R be the utility function.
Notation. For each i ∈ I, let us denote
Definition 2. (Nash, [14] ) The family Γ = (G i , u i ) i∈I is said to be a strategic game.
Definition 3. (Nash, [14] ) An equilibrium for Γ is defined as a point
Definition 4. The family G = (G i , P i ) i∈I is said to be a qualitative game.
Definition 5. A maximal element for G is defined as a point x * ∈ i∈I G i such that for each i ∈ I, P i (x * ) = ∅.
A qualitative game G = (G i , P i ) i∈I generalizes a strategic game Γ = (G i , u i ) i∈I by defining
The qualitative game corresponding to Γ is G = (G i , P i ) i∈I , where
Now we define a transitivity type of correspondences.
Definition 6. Let i∈I G i be a product space and let P : i∈I G i → 2 G i be a correspondence. We say that P has the property T if
Example 2. P 1 and P 2 from Example 1 have the property T :
Definition 7. Let i∈I G i be a product space and let P, Q : i∈I G i → 2 G i be correspondences. We say that the pair (P, Q) has the property T if for each x ∈ i∈I G i , P (x) ⊂ Q(x) and
Example 3. If we take Q =clP in Example 2, we obtain that the pair (P, Q) has the property T.
∅ otherwise and
We note that
and Q has convex closed values, so that Q verifies the assumptions stated in the hypothesis of the theorems from Section 3. 4 We introduce the following class of games. Let I be a non-empty set (the set of agents). For each i ∈ I, let G i be a non-empty topological vector space representing the set of actions, and let P i , Q i : i∈I G i → 2 G i be correspondences (P i is the preference correspondence).
Definition 8. The family G = (G i , P i , Q i ) i∈I is said to be a general qualitative game with property T if for each i ∈ I, the pair (P i , Q i ) satisfies the property T..
Definition 9.
A maximal element for the general qualitative game G is defined as a point x * ∈ i∈I G i such that for each i ∈ I, P i (x * ) = ∅.
3. GAME REDUCTION
DEFINITIONS
This subsection gives preliminary definitions on parings and strict dominance for qualitative games.
We introduce a relation of strict dominance for the qualitative games, which generalizes the notion of dominance due to Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] .
Definition 11. Given a pairing H of G, the strict dominance relation ≻ H on G i can be defined:
Let us consider parings G, H with the property that H i ⊆ G i for each i ∈ I. We generalize, for qualitative games, the types of game reduction used by Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] , in the following way.
* H is defined by the existence of (finite or countable infinite) sequence of parings R t of G, t = 0, 1, 2..., such that R 0 = G, R t → R t+1 fast for each t ≥ 0 and
Now, we consider the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies which involves elimination of strategies that are strictly dominated by a strategy from the currently considered game H and not the initial game G. We study the reductions of qualitative games in the form below and we introduce the next definition which generalizes the one of Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [9] for qualitative games.
If all H i are empty, we call H an empty restriction.
* H is defined by the existence of (finite or countably infinite) sequence of parings
We further generalize the definition considered by Milgrom and Roberts [13] .
iii) the reduction G * H is defined by the existence of (finite or countable infinite) sequence of parings
We have the following lemma.
Proof. Let us assume that the reduction G * H is defined by the existence of (finite or countable infinite) sequence of parings R t of G, t = 0, 1, 2..., such that R 0 = G, R t R t+1 fast for each t ≥ 0 and
for each i ∈ I. Assume also that the reduction G ⇒ * H ′ is defined by the existence of (finite or countable infinite) sequence of parings R ′t of G, t = 0, 1, 2..., such that R ′0 = G, R ′t → R ′t+1 fast for each t ≥ 0 and
for each i ∈ I. Since for each t, the reductions R t R t+1 and R ′t → R ′t+1 are fast, then, for each t, R t ⊆ R ′t . We prove the last assertion by induction. Suppose the claim holds for all t ≤ T and consider the induction step for T + 1. Let i ∈ I be fixed and let
THE PROBLEM OF GAME REDUCTION AND ORDER INDEPEN-DENCE
We reconsider the iterative processes in which the dominated strategies are removed and the limit of this process can be an empty or a nonempty set of strategies. If, for the case of the strategic games, the remained strategies are the rationalizable ones, it seems that the process itself deserves to be studied and leads us to a kind of´rationalizable´result, also for the case of generalized games. In order to better understand the problem and motivate our demarche, we give several examples.
We first consider example 1 due to Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] and its generalization.
where for each i ∈ {1, 2}, u i is defined in the following way
By eliminating X i \{1, x} for i ∈ {1, 2} and x ∈ [0, 1), we have that
This game can not be → reduced. In this case, since x is arbitrary, the IESDS procedure is an order dependent one.
Example 6. We consider the game from example 2.
It follows that (x 1 , x 2 ) is a maximal element for the ⇒ * reduced game and that it is not a maximal element for the initial game.
The example of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] involves games with discontinuous utility functions. These authors let an open problem for researcers to find classes of games for which order independence holds. As it can be seen in this subsection, the problem of the existence of nonempty maximal reductions can be reconsidered for qualitative games, which can also be generalizations of discontinuous strategic games. The aim of this paper is mainly to generalize the results obtained by Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] and Apt [1] .
CONDITIONS C(t) AND D(t)
Let us consider a game reduction from G to H, defined by a finite or countable infinite sequence of parings R t of G. We generalize the property C(t) proposed by Apt [1] . It refers to the fact that every strictly dominated strategy on each R t has an undominated dominator.
Definition 16. We call Condition C(t) the following property of the initial game: for all i ∈ I,
Remark 1. For H = G, we obtain the following:
The next property concerns the strict dominance in the reduction R t . It is also an extension of Condition D(t) considered by Apt [1] .
Definition 17. Condition D(t) states that each strategy x i strictly dominated in R t is strictly dominated in R t by some strategy in R t . Formally, we can write that for all i ∈ I :
The next lemma states the relation between the two properties introduced above.
Lemma 2. For each t, the property C(t) implies the property D(t). 
Proof. Let us consider
for each i ∈ I and therefore M ′ is nonempty. We can prove in the same way that
The next theorem states the relation between ( * ) and (⇒ * )− reductions of a game.
Theorem 4.
Assume that the reduction G * H is defined by the existence of (finite or countable infinite) sequence of parings R t of G, t = 0, 1, 2..., and the reduction G ⇒ * H ′ is defined by the existence of (finite or countable infinite) sequence of parings R ′t of G, t = 0, 1, 2...
Assume that property D(s) holds for each s < t. Then, R t = R ′t . In particular, if D(t) holds for each t, then, H = H ′ ; then, G has a unique ( ⇒ * )−maximal reduction, if G has a unique ( * )−maximal reduction. Proof. We will first prove R Let
We conclude that x i is a strategy in R 
THE MAIN RESULTS
We state the results concerning the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies for several classes of qualitative games. The existence and uniqueness of maximal reductions are proved. [8] by considering qualitative games with U−majorized correspondences defined by Yuan and Tarafdar. A proof of uniqueness of the maximal reduction of G is given in this case.
Theorem 4 generalizes Lemma of Dufwenberg and Stegeman
We first present the notion of U-majorized correspondence, which generalize the classical upper semicontinuous correspondences.
Definition 18. (Yuan and Tarafdar, [20] ). Let X be a topological space and Y be a non-empty subset of a vector space E, θ : X → E a function and P : X → 2 Y a correspondence.
1) P is of class U θ (or U) if: i) for each x ∈ X, θ(x) / ∈ P (x) and ii) P is upper semicontinuous with closed convex values in Y ; 2) A correspondence P x : X → 2 Y is a U θ -majorant of P at x if there exists an open neighborhood N(x) of x such that i) for each z ∈ V (x), P (z) ⊂ P x (z) and θ(z) / ∈ P x (z); ii) P x is upper semicontinuous with closed convex values; 3) P is U θ −majorized if for each x ∈ X with P (x) = ∅, there exists a U-majorant P x of P at x.
The following theorem is Ding's result on the existence of maximal elements of qualitative games. The correspondences are U−majorized.
Theorem 5. (Ding, [7] )Let X be a nonempty subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space and D a non-empty compact subset of X. Let P : X → 2 D be a U−majorized correspondence. Then, there exists x * ∈coD such that P (x * ) = ∅.
Theorem 6. Let I be a set of players, G i be a compact convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space ∀i ∈ I and the general qualitative game G = (G i , P i , Q i ) i∈I which satisfies the property T , where P i , Q i : i∈I G i → 2 G i satisfies the following assumptions for each i ∈ I :
Then, a) If G → * H is a game reduction and if there exists y i ≻ H x i , for some x i , y i ∈ G i and i ∈ I, there exists
Proof. a) Let R t be the sequence of parings of G, t = 0, 1, 2..., such that
According to i), we have that Z i = ∅. The set Z i is convex and closed, so it is compact. Since y i ≻ H x i , we have that H −i = ∅. Let x * −i ∈ H −i be fixed and
and since the pair (P i , Q i ) has the property T on i∈I H i , it follows that for an i fixed. We have that
We obtain the following corollary for qualitative games having upper semicontinuous correspondences P i , i ∈ I.
Corollary 7. Let I be a set of players, G i be a compact convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space ∀i ∈ I and the general qualitative game G = (G i , P i , Q i ) i∈I which satisfies the property T , where P i , Q i : i∈I G i → 2 G i satisfies the following assumptions for each i ∈ I :
Liu and Cai [11] defined the correspondences of class Q and the Qmajorized correspondences.
Definition 19. (Liu and Cai, [11] ) Let X be a topological space and Y be a non-empty subset of a vector space E, θ : X → E a function and P : X → 2 Y a correspondence.
1) P is of class
i) for each x ∈ X, θ(x) / ∈clP (x) and ii) P is lower semicontinuous with open and convex values in Y ; 2) A correspondence P x : X → 2 Y is a Q θ -majorant of P at x, if there exists an open neighborhood N(x) of x such that: i) for each z ∈ N(x), P (z) ⊂ P x (z) and θ(z) / ∈clP x (z); ii) P x is lower semicontinuous with open convex values; 3) P is Q θ -majorized if for each x ∈ X with P (x) = ∅, there exists a Q θ -majorant P x of P at x.
The next result is also due to Liu and Cai and states the maximal element existence for qualitative games with Q θ −majorized correspondences. Theorem 8. (Liu, Cai, [11] ). Let X be a convex paracompact subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space E, let D be a nonempty compact metrizable subset of X. Let P : X → 2 D be a Q θ −majorized correspondence. Then, there exists x * ∈ X such that P (x * ) = ∅.
Theorem 6 concerns the games with Q θ −majorized correspondences.
Theorem 9. Let I be a set of players, G i be a compact convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space ∀i ∈ I and the general qualitative game G = (G i , P i , Q i ) i∈I which satisfies the property T , where P i , Q i : i∈I G i → 2 G i satisfy the following assumptions for each i ∈ I :
b) a non-empty maximal → * reduction of G is the unique maximal reduction of G.
Since a correspondence of class Q is Q-majorized, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 10. Let I be a set of players, G i be a compact convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space ∀i ∈ I and the general qualitative game G = (G i , P i , Q i ) i∈I which satisfies the property T , where P i , Q i : i∈I G i → 2 G i satisfy the following assumptions for each i ∈ I :
ii) Q i has convex closed values; iii) for each x i ∈ G i , x i / ∈cl P i (x) and iv) P i is lower semicontinuous with open and convex values in G i ; Then, a) If G → * H is a a game reduction and if there exists y i ≻ H x i , for some x i , y i ∈ G i and i ∈ I, there exists
We present here the notion of L S −majorized correspondence. Let X be a topological space and I be an index set. For each i ∈ I, let Y i be a non-empty convex subset of a topological vector space E i . Let Y = i∈I Y i and S : Y → X be a function. For each i ∈ I, let P i : X → 2 Y i be a correspondence.
Definition 20. (Yuan, [19] ). P i is said to be:
1) of class L S if: i) P i has convex values; ii) y i / ∈ P i (S(y)) for each y ∈ Y , and iii) P
there exists an open neighborhood N(x) of x in X and a correspondence with convex values
We also have the following theorem due to Chang [4] on non-compact spaces.
Theorem 11. (Chang, [4] ) Let X be a convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E and let P : X → 2 X be a L S −majorized correspondence. Suppose that there exists a compact set D in X such that, for each finite subset S of X, there exists a convex compact set K, which contains S and which satisfies K\
The following result is a consequence of Chang's Theorem.
Theorem 12. Let I be a set of players, G i be a compact convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space ∀i ∈ I and the general qualitative game G = (G i , P i , Q i ) i∈I , which satisfies the property T, where P i , Q i : i∈I G i → 2 G i satisfy the following assumptions for each i ∈ I :
is a a game reduction and if there exists y i ≻ H x i , for some x i , y i ∈ G i and i ∈ I, there exists
Since a correspondence of class L is L S -majorized, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 13. Let I be a set of players, G i be a compact convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space ∀i ∈ I and the general qualitative game G = (G i , P i , Q i ) i∈I , which satisfies the property T, where
G i satisfy the following assumptions for each i ∈ I :
Then, a) If G → * H is a a game reduction and if there exists y i ≻ H x i , for some x i , y i ∈ G i and i ∈ I, there exists
Remark 2.
For H = G, we obtain that under the conditions of Corollary 3, we have the following: if there exists y i ≻ G x i , for some x i , y i ∈ G i and i ∈ I, there exists
The next theorem is a generalization of Theorem 1 of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] for the class of qualitative games. Theorem 14. Let G = (G i , P i , Q i ) i∈I be a general qualitative game, where for each i ∈ I, G i is a non-empty compact subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space and P i : i∈I G i such that: i) P i has compactly open lower sections and convex values; ii)
Then, G has a unique maximal → * reduction M. Further, ∀i ∈ I, M i is nonempty, compact and P i|M has compactly open lower sections.
Proof. We will prove further that G has a nonempty maximal reduction.The proof of its uniqueness is a consequence of Corollary 3.
1) We first establish that if G → H is fast and H is compact, H i is compact and nonempty. Choose i such that H i = G i . Then, y i ≻ G x for some x, y ∈ G i and then the set H i is nonempty.
We will prove that H i is compact. Let y i ∈ H i and Z(y i ) = C X P −1 i (y i ), where X = i∈I G i . According to the assumption ii), Z(y i ) = ∅ and according to i), Z(y i ) is closed in the compact set i∈I G i , and therefore it is compact.
Define Z i (y i ) :=pr i Z(y i ). We have that Z(y i ) is a non-empty closed set in G i with y i ∈ Z i (y i ). Now, we prove that
2) Let R t , t = 0, 1, ... denote the unique sequence of games of G such that R 0 = G and R t → R t+1 is fast ∀t. Result 1 implies that R t is compact and nonempty ∀t, so that M i = ∩ t R t i is compact and nonempty. According to i), it follows that P
We still have to show that M is a maximal → * reduction of G. Let's consider i ∈ I and x i ∈ M i . We will prove that x i is not dominated by any y i ∈ M i . Let y i ∈ M i ,and let A = C X −i B, where B = {x −i ∈ G −i :
is nonempty and compact for every t, such that R t = M. This fact implies A ∩ M −i is nonempty and then,
MAXIMAL ELEMENTS FOR QUALITATIVE GAMES
This subsection is meant to prove that the set of maximal elements is preserved in any game by the process of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Theorem 15. Let G = (G i , P i , Q i ) i∈I be a general qualitative game which satisfies property T and x i / ∈ P i (x i , x −i ) for each x −i ∈ i∈I G i . Let us assume that for each x ∈ i∈I G i , there exists z * ∈ i∈I G i such that z * i ∈ Q i (z i , x −i ) for all z ∈ i∈I G i and i ∈ I. If H is a (⇒ * )−reduction of G, then games G and H have the same maximal elements.
Proof. Let R t , t = 0, 1, ... denote the unique sequence of games of G such that R 0 = G, R t ⇒ R t+1 is fast ∀t and H i = ∩ t R t i for each i ∈ I. Suppose that x * ∈ i∈I G i is a maximal element in the game G, that is P i (x * ) = ∅ and then, x * i is never eliminated in the sequence R t ∀i ∈ I. It follows that x * ∈ i∈I H i , so that P i| i∈I H i (x * ) = ∅ and, therefore, P i| i∈I H i (x * ) ∩ H i = ∅ and x is also a maximal element in game H. Conversely, let x * ∈ i∈I H i be a maximal element in game H (P i (x * ) ∩ H i = ∅ for each i ∈ I) and consider z * as in the hypothesis: z * ∈ i∈I G i such that z * i ∈ Q i (z, x * −i ) for all z ∈ i∈I G i . We will prove that P i (z i is never eliminated in the sequence R t ∀i ∈ I, and z * ∈ i∈I H i . The last assertion implies z * i ∈ Q i (z i , x * −i ) ∩ H i for all z ∈ i∈I G i . We will prove that P i (x * ) = ∅. Let us assume, on the contrary, that there exists x ′ ∈ i∈I G i such that x ′ i ∈ P i (x * ) for each i ∈ I. Then, according to Property T, we have that
. However, we have that z * i ∈ Q i (x ′ i , x −i ) from hypothesis, so that z * i ∈ P i (x * ). In addition, z * i ∈ H i and, then, z * i ∈ P i (x * ) ∩ H i , which contradicts the fact that P i (x * ) ∩ H i = ∅. In conclusion, P i (x * ) must be the empty set and x * is a maximal element for game G.
For the (→ * )−reductions of a game, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 16. Let G = (G i , P i , Q i ) i∈I be a general qualitative game which satisfies property T and x i / ∈ P i (x i , x −i ) for each x −i ∈ i∈I G i . Let us assume that for each x ∈ i∈I G i , there exists z * ∈ i∈I G i such that z * i ∈ Q i (z i , x −i ) for all z ∈ i∈I G i and i ∈ I. If H is a (→ * )−reduction of G, then games G and H have the same maximal elements.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] let an open problem for researchers, that is to find classes of games for which order independence holds. We reconsidered the problem of the existence of nonempty maximal reductions for qualitative games, which can be generalizations of discontinuous strategic games. We generalized the results obtained by Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] and Apt [1] .
